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Capture the Flag (CTF) competitions are increasingly important for the 
Brazilian cybersecurity community as education and professional tools. 
Unfortunately, CTF platforms may suffer from security issues, giving an 
unfair advantage to competitors. To mitigate this, we propose NIZKCTF, the 
first open-audit CTF platform based on non-interactive zero-knowledge 
proofs. 
Educational technology, Cryptography, Distributed information systems 
A critical element of a robust cybersecurity strategy is developing talent in modern 
technological security issues. Research shows that the United States is the most prepared 
country against cyber attacks,1 however, there is also a problem of quantity and quality of 
professionals, especially when it comes to more sophisticated skills such as security by 
design, defensive programming, applied cryptography, threat intelligence and forensic 
analysis after a compromise.2 This problem is aggravated in developing countries, where 
access to bleeding-edge resources for professional training based on real-world 
experience is limited. 
In order to reduce the shortage of cybersecurity professionals, companies, schools, 
universities and military institutions have been promoting Capture the Flag (CTF) 
competitions around the world to foster the engagement of professionals in cybersecurity 
topics. CTF competitions are usually designed to serve an educational purpose to give 
participants experience with computer security problems from a wide spectrum of 
technical areas, as well as conducting and reacting to the sort of attacks found in the real 
world. CTF competitions can also serve as a convenient recruiting tool to fill specific 
positions with highly-skilled talent. Reverse-engineering, exploitation, forensics, web 
programming and cryptanalysis are among the typical required skills in CTF 
competitions. Because CTF competitions are inexpensive to organize and run, they are 
strategic to countries such as Brazil, allowing the local community to interact and 
compete with international players. 
There are two styles of CTF competitions: attack/defense and jeopardy. In an 
attack/defense competition, each team is given a machine to defend on an isolated 
network. Teams are scored based on both their success in defending their assigned 
machine and on their success in attacking the other teams’ machines. Jeopardy 
competitions are more common and usually involve multiple categories of problems, 
each of which contains a variety of questions of different values and levels of difficulty. 
A correct solution to a problem reveals a flag, which is submitted to the scoring platform 
for points. Teams attempt to earn the most points in the competition's time frame (e.g., 24 
hours), but usually do not directly attack each other. Rather than a race, this style of 
gameplay encourages taking time to approach challenges and prioritizes quantity of 
correct submissions over the timing. 
An important concern is to protect the CTF software platform against attacks. The 
platform is usually responsible for storing the flags and updating the scoreboard as the 
contest progresses. Unfortunately, because CTF platforms suffer from the same software 
security issues as any software component and due to incentives from the high 
competitiveness in such environments, it is common to find teams targeting the platform 
instead of the challenges. There are no independently verifiable guarantees that the teams 
really solved the challenges and the scoreboard is correct. Successful attacks against the 
platform arguably demonstrate relevant skills, but organizers may be more interested in 
enforcing the rules and rewarding solutions for the challenges, due to sponsorship duties 
or focused recruiting efforts. 
In this paper, we propose a novel platform for jeopardy-style competitions called 
NIZKCTF: Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Capture the Flag Platform. With 
NIZKCTF, there are no flags stored in the platform, and therefore, for a solved challenge, 
the team does not submit the flag itself, but a public zero-knowledge proof. This proof is 
specific for the team and the challenge. Since it is a public proof, the platform and other 
teams can audit and confirm that the team has indeed solved the challenge, without being 
able to deduce the flag. We implemented NIZKCTF as an open-source project and its 
architecture includes software elements such as a Git-based centralized repository (i.e., to 
commit the flags and receive the event updates), and a continuous integration system 
(i.e., to automatically merge all requests of teams in the repository of the competition). 
Any CTF promoter can instantiate and use NIZKCTF in their competition. After 
validating the usefulness and security of NIZKCTF in two smaller competitions, we 
adopted the platform to host the 2017 edition of Pwn2Win, an internationally advertised 
and bilingual Brazilian CTF. During and after the CTFs, teams were not able to 
compromise the final result. 
History and Background 
The first CTF competition apparently was hosted during DEFCON 1996 in Las Vegas. In 
Brazil, hacking challenges are usually conducted in loco during national security events 
such as the Hackers 2 Hackers Conference (www.h2hc.com.br) since at least 2007. The 
first widely advertised jeopardy-style competition was Hacking n' Roll 
(www.insert.uece.br/en/events), which began to be organized in 2010 by the Information 
Security Research Team of the State University of Ceará (UECE). In 2014, more 
competitions started to appear, such as the Pwn2Win (on line) and Hackaflag (in loco) 
CTFs. Despite challenges being enunciated only in Portuguese, a Ukrainian team 
participated in the 2014 editions of Pwn2Win and Hacking n’ Roll, increasing the interest 
for bilingual and internationally advertised competitions. In March 2016, Pwn2Win 
became the first Brazilian CTF listed in the CTFtime (ctftime.org) international index, 
followed by 3DSCTF in December of the same year. Figure 1 shows the growing trend in 
active participation of Brazilian teams in international competitions. 
Figure 1. After the first bilingual Brazilian competitions were promoted in 2016, there 
was an increase in the number of internationally active Brazilian teams indexed by 
CTFtime. 
As organizers of the Pwn2Win CTF, the authors faced scalability issues during the 2016 
edition. In the last couple of hours of the competition, the main software platform became 
nearly unable to render the scoreboard due to the amount of concurrent access. Although 
this issue could be alleviated by adopting a more efficient open source platform, there 
was a growing apprehension of facing denial-of-service attacks or even having flags 
leaked due to a software security flaw or server misconfiguration. As newcomers to the 
international CTF scene, this could undermine the reputation of Brazilian competitions as 
a whole, which motivated this work toward a more robust and transparent CTF platform. 
Problem Statement 
The impact of software vulnerabilities in CTF platforms is high and gives a 
disproportionate competitive advantage to skilled teams able to exploit the platform 
instead of solving the competition challenges. This paper addresses this problem by 
improving the security of the competition platform and intends to answer the following 
questions: (i) how to guarantee integrity and a minimum level of fairness in a jeopardy-
style CTF competition, preventing teams from stealing flags by exploiting the platform? 
(ii) how to ensure auditability, allowing anyone to verify whether teams really solved the 
challenges according to the points presented in the scoreboard? (iii) how to replicate the 
information required for checking correctness of solutions to the players, to reduce the 
impact of eventual platform unavailability? 
Unfortunately, it is common to find vulnerabilities in CTF platforms, as illustrated by 
two high-profile recent examples: 
• RC3 CTF 2016: For a moment during this CTF, the first place team had 3590 
points. Suddenly, a team named “The board is vulnerable, please contact 
admin@seadog007.me” appeared in the scoreboard with 4500 points 
(github.com/seadog007/RC3-CTF-2016-scoreboard). Figure 2 shows the record 
of this fact. 
• CODEGATE CTF 2016 Finals: During this CTF, a team discovered that the 
server hosting one of the challenges had an old kernel version and was vulnerable 
to OverlayFS privilege escalation (CVE-2016-1576). The team members were 
able to gain root access and get some “free flags” (although they claim that they 
did not submit these flags until they really solved the challenges). Tracing the 
system calls of the SSH server, they waited for an administrator to log in and were 
able to get their password. Then, the team noticed that other servers (including the 
scoreboard) had the same password. After visiting the platform servers and having 
fun, they stopped the intrusion and proceeded to play as usual 
(mslc.ctf.su/wp/codegategate). 
Figure 2. In RC3 CTF 2016, hackers exploited the scoreboard to report the vulnerability 
to the competition administrators. 
Related Work 
Concerns about securing a CTF platform against attacks or just making the competition 
more fair are not new. In 2015, University of Birmingham and Imperial College London3 
announced a virtual machine (VM) containing vulnerable services and challenges: each 
student runs the VM locally and attempts to solve challenges inside the VM as they are 
made available. Solving a challenge reveals a flag that is unique to a particular VM 
instance, allowing for the detection of collusion between students. As well as acquiring 
flags, students also had to provide traditional written answers to questions and sit an 
examination. 
In 2015, Carnegie Mellon University4 released an automatic problem generator (APG) 
for CTF competitions, where a given challenge is not fixed, but rather can have many 
different automatically generated problem instances. APG offers players a unique 
experience and can facilitate deliberate practice where problems vary just enough to 
make sure a user can replicate the solution idea. APG also allows competition 
administrators to detect when users submit a copied flag from another user to the scoring 
server. 
There are other works regarding problems that may affect the overall quality of 
CTFs.5–8 Chung et al.5 present insights and lessons learned from organizing CSAW, one 
of the largest and most successful CTFs. Vigna et al.6 present lessons learned in running 
iCTF, the world’s largest attack/defense CTF, in which online players from several 
countries compete against each other. Chapman et al.7 present the competition design of 
PicoCTF, as well as an evaluation based on survey responses and website interaction 
statistics, and insights into the students who played. 
Despite the relevance, these works do not address solutions for the security problem of 
players attacking the CTF platform. A first issue is players attacking the platform to steal 
the flags. Although common sense dictates that flags should be processed with a one-way 
function, similarly to how passwords are usually stored, Table 1 shows that most of the 
previously existing open-source CTF platforms do not support this feature. The only 
exception is PicoCTF Platform 2, which checks whether flags are correct by calling a 
script specific to each challenge. The script could be configured to check against a 
protected flag, although this use case is not a built-in feature or documented at all. 
Our proposed solution is discussed next. 
Table 1. Comparison between NIZKCTF and previously existing open 
source platforms 
Platform URL Supports 
protected flags 
Supports 
regex flags 
NIZKCTF github.com/pwn2winctf/nizkctf-tutorial yes no 
CTFd github.com/CTFd/CTFd no yes 
FBCTF github.com/facebook/fbctf no no 
HackTheArch github.com/mcpa-stlouis/hack-the-arch no yes 
Mellivora github.com/Nakiami/mellivora no no 
NightShade github.com/UnrealAkama/NightShade no yes 
PicoCTF Platform 2 github.com/picoCTF/picoCTF-Platform-2 yes yes 
RootTheBox github.com/moloch--/RootTheBox no yes 
PyChallFactory github.com/pdautry/py_chall_factory no no 
Competition Protocol 
This section describes the novel competition protocol employed by NIZKCTF. A threat 
model for CTF competitions is defined, followed by a formalization of the main 
theoretical tools and requirements for auditability, together with textual descriptions for 
the security properties and employed schemes for clarification. 
Threat Model 
In a CTF competition, the adversary is a player or team interested in exploiting 
vulnerabilities in the platform, instead of solving challenges, to obtain advantages such as 
stealing flags or manipulating the scoreboard. Due to the difficulty in developing a 
vulnerability-free system, NIZKCTF relies on cryptographic primitives, such as zero-
knowledge proofs, to provide security properties. 
Another form of adversarial behavior is a team who wants to submit flags in place of 
another team without their consent (e.g., to harm a specific team by making it fall behind 
on the scoreboard). For this reason, NIZKCTF makes a zero-knowledge proof to be 
unique to a particular team. 
The protocol alone does not protect against flag sharing, i.e., teams copying and 
submitting flags from others. For a solution that addresses this type of adversary, recall 
the automatic problem generation proposed by Burket et al.4 Since in a competition based 
on NIZKCTF it is possible to have automatic problem generation, our proposal can be 
extended to support protection against a flag-sharing adversary. 
Zero-knowledge Proof of Knowledge 
Let L  be a NP language such that ipk L  iff there exists a witness isk  yielding 
( , ) 1L i iM pk sk = , where LM  is a polynomial-time Turing machine. Let us also assume 
that the probability of computing isk  from ipk  in polynomial time is negligible. 
A non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof of knowledge9 is a cryptographic 
scheme through which a prover knowing isk  can convince a verifier of that fact, 
satisfying the following properties: 
• Non-interactivity: Access to a public set of common parameters and to the 
contents of the proof itself must be sufficient to verify a proof. Since no 
interaction with the prover is required, any party interested in acting as a verifier 
may do so. 
• Completeness: If ipk L  the proof generated by an honest prover knowing isk  
must be accepted by an honest verifier:  
  
Prove( , )  Verify( , ) 1i i ipk sk pk =  =  
• Validity: Any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) prover who does not know isk  
must have negligible probability of success  of convincing a verifier. 
Equivalently, for every possible PPT prover P (even malicious ones) there exists a 
knowledge extractor Extract that, given oracle access to P, is able to extract isk  
with overwhelming probability (1 )−  every time P succeeds in completing a new 
proof:  
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where Q  denotes a query tape which registers all previous queries that have been 
sent to a prover. 
• Zero-knowledge: The proof discloses no information about isk  besides the fact 
that the prover knows its value. Equivalently, for every possible PPT verifier V 
(even malicious ones) there exists a simulator Sim  that, given oracle access to V, 
is able to convince V with a negligible difference in probability  when compared 
to an honest prover, even though Sim has no knowledge of isk :  
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In NIZKCTF, values ipk  are publicly disclosed, but the corresponding isk  which allows 
proving ipk L  is kept secret. Every player holds a witness tsk  attesting membership to 
their team t . When a player solves a challenge c  of the competition, they obtain a 
witness csk  asserting they hold the answer to the challenge. In order to earn points for 
their team, the player needs to publicly prove simultaneous knowledge of tsk  and csk . 
The concept of simultaneous knowledge is formalized by performing proofs on an 
auxiliary NP language 
t cpk pk L‖  such that t cpk pk L‖  iff there exists a witness 
t csk sk‖  such that ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 1L t c t c L t t L c cM pk pk sk sk M pk sk M pk sk =  =‖ ‖ , where the 
operator ‖  denotes string concatenation. 
Different approaches exist for proving knowledge of witness 
t csk sk‖ , but their 
practicality depends on the exact choice of LM  and, consequently, of LM  . A first 
approach would be a general-purpose non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof 
system, but the generality comes with a price, in the form of substantial processing time 
and large public parameters required to construct a proof. 
A scheme based on digital signatures. The approach proposed and implemented in 
NIZKCTF consists in choosing a ( , )L i iM pk sk  which verifies whether isk  is the private 
key corresponding to the public key ipk  in a digital signature scheme. This choice allows 
us to reduce our proof of knowledge problem to that of digitally signing messages, whose 
implementation is simpler and more efficient than any known general-purpose NIZK 
proof system. 
The Schnorr signature scheme and its key-prefixed variant over elliptic curves 
EdDSA10 satisfy completeness, validity and zero-knowledge properties under the 
assumption that the discrete logarithm problem over elliptic curves (ECDLP) is hard. 11–12 
However, incorrectly composing two signatures when constructing a proof of 
simultaneous knowledge may undermine the validity of such properties. 
Let the following be the primitives of a secure digital signature scheme: 
 
Sign( , )isk m s m= ‖  (1) 
 
, if s is valid
Open( , )
, otherwise
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m
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‖
 (2) 
Equation 1 signs the message m  using the private key isk , then outputs the signature 
s  prepended to the message m . Equation 2 verifies whether s  is a valid signature for m  
produced by the private key isk  corresponding to the public key ipk , then outputs the 
original message m  if the signature is valid, or ⊥  if it is invalid. 
We propose the following scheme to prove knowledge of the witness t csk sk‖  
corresponding to t cpk pk L‖ : 
 
Prove( , ) Sign( ,Sign( , ))t c t c c tpk pk sk sk sk sk c=‖ ‖  (3) 
 1, if
Verify( , )
0, if ,
where Open( ,Open( , ))
t c
t c
m c
pk pk
m c
m pk pk


=
= 

=
‖
 (4) 
We argue that Equations 3 and 4 satisfy the properties of a NIZK proof of knowledge 
scheme: 
• Non-interactivity: Since tpk , cpk  and the digital signature scheme parameters are 
public and known to all parties, the proof   can be verified by Equation 4 
without interaction with the prover. 
• Completeness: Since Open( ,Sign( , ))i ipk sk m m=  for all i  and for all m  such 
that ( , ) 1L i iM pk sk = , by simply substituting into Equations 3 and 4:  
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Verify( ,Prove( , )) 1.
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• Validity: If the digital signature scheme satisfies validity, there exists a 
knowledge extractor Extract( , )ipk s m‖  able to extract isk  from the Sign( , )isk m  
operation implemented by any (possibly malicious) PPT prover P. Therefore, a 
knowledge extractor Extract’ able to extract 
t csk sk‖  from P is constructed as 
follows:  
  
t c c tExtract (pk pk ,s s c)=
Extract( , ) Extract( , ).t t c c tpk s c pk s s c
 ‖ ‖ ‖
‖ ‖ ‖ ‖
  
Let Q  be the query tape of Sign( , )isk m , and Q  be the query tape of 
Prove( , )t c t cpk pk sk sk‖ ‖ . Extract’ does not succeed if ( , )tsk c Q , since P may 
replay 
ts c‖  from a previous run, causing Extract( , )t tpk s c‖  to fail in extracting 
tsk . Similarly, Extract’ does not succeed if ( , )c tsk s c Q‖ , since P may replay 
c ts s c‖ ‖  from a previous run, causing Extract( , )c c tpk s s c‖ ‖  to fail in 
extracting csk . However, since all messages signed by tsk  reference c , 
( , ) ( , )t t c t csk c Q pk pk sk sk Q  ‖ ‖ . Similarly, since all messages signed by 
csk  reference t , ( , ) ( , )c t t c t csk s c Q pk pk sk sk Q  ‖ ‖ ‖ . The definition of 
validity allows the knowledge extractor to fail when ( , )t c t cpk pk sk sk Q‖ ‖ , 
thus existence of Extract’ proves that validity is satisfied. 
• Zero-knowledge: If the digital signature scheme satisfies zero-knowledge of the 
private key isk , there exists a simulator Sim( , )ipk m  able to convince the validity 
of the signed message s m‖  to the Open( , )ipk s m‖  operation implemented by 
any (possibly malicious) PPT verifier V. Therefore, there exists a simulator Sim’ 
able to convince V of the proof validity:  
  t c c t
Sim (pk pk )=Sim(pk ,Sim(pk ,c)). ‖
 
Requirements for the challenge witness. Zero-knowledge of the witness csk  is useful 
only as long as csk  cannot be easily found by exhaustive search. Recall LM  and cpk  are 
public. Therefore, if csk  does not have sufficient randomness, an offline brute-force 
attack has non-negligible chance of success in finding its value. 
In some CTFs, the flag cf  for a challenge c  consists of a random hexadecimal string 
large enough (e.g., 256 bits, after decoding) to make a brute-force attack unfeasible. In 
this case, the flag cf  can be used directly as the seed for a deterministic digital signature 
key pair generator: 
 
( , ) KeyPair( )c c csk pk f=  
Many competitions, however, adopt password-like flags, such as “CTF-
BR{you_mastered_technique_X}”. In this case, a slow to compute password-based key 
derivation function (PBKDF) can be used along with a public salt value c  to increase 
the difficulty of an offline brute-force attack:13 
 
( , ) KeyPair(PBKDF( , ))c c c csk pk f=  (5) 
In NIZKCTF, we use Equation 5 as a conservative choice to support both types of 
flags. We adopt scrypt14 as a PBKDF and adjust its parameters aiming to make a brute-
force attack non-viable within the few hours of the competition. 
Auditability 
In order to allow CTFs to be openly audited and independently verified, it is necessary to 
carry out all operations in a database and satisfy the following requirements: 
• History preservation: The database must be able to recover a snapshot of its state 
after each committed transaction and preserve the logical order of these 
transactions. 
• Immutability: Once a transaction is committed, the database must prevent it from 
being erased. If an application needs to revert data to a previous state, the only 
way to perform that operation must be by performing a new transaction. 
• Replication: Anyone interested in auditing the competition must be able to 
retrieve and replicate the entire contents and transaction history of the database. 
Implementation 
Different instances of NIZKCTF can be constructed by choosing distinct underlying 
technologies. We selected components for implementing NIZKCTF with the goal of 
maximizing the usage of free-of-charge hosted services like GitHub (or GitLab) and 
Amazon cloud services which provide a permanent free tier (AWS Lambda and SNS). 
Our implementation (github.com/pwn2winctf/2017) is composed by the following 
modules: a distributed storage for sharing data (implemented by a Git repository), a 
continuous integration script for accepting submissions (implemented by an AWS 
Lambda function), a command-line interface for interacting with the platform, and a web 
interface for displaying the list of challenges and the scoreboard. 
As can be seen in Figure 3, the distributed storage is used for propagating the 
necessary data while keeping the full change history. Players then interact with the 
distributed storage by using the command-line interface, which implements the 
NIZKCTF protocol. A request to merge the new data with the main repository is created 
and later evaluated by the continuous integration script, which checks the validity of the 
modifications, then decides to accept or deny the request. After the changes are merged, 
the web interface starts using the most recent version of the data. 
Figure 3. Overview of our implementation. Players modify local Git repositories and 
create pull requests to the central repository. An AWS Lambda function is triggered to 
merge the pull request to the central repository if changes are valid. 
The distributed storage allows the replication of challenges, team registrations, proofs 
and other CTF metadata while ensuring that the entire history is preserved. In our 
implementation, this property is achieved by adopting a Git repository as the database. 
Git commits are stored as a Directed Acyclic Graph that can be later queried. This allows 
any participant to audit all changes made, including ordering and timestamps. 
When changes are made to the player’s local storage, a pull request is created to merge 
the modifications with the central Git repository managed by the competition’s staff. The 
pull request is evaluated by the continuous integration script and, if accepted, all changed 
data is incorporated and can be propagated to other teams. 
In order to avoid tampering with commit history, the repository is configured to 
disallow force pushes. Without force pushes, changes committed to the central repository 
must always descent from the central repository history. In other words, pushed commits 
are not allowed to modify the commit chain, guaranteeing immutability of previously 
committed changes. 
The continuous integration script is triggered by a GitHub hook to automatically 
accept pull requests containing team registrations and proof submissions. However, since 
it does not have access to any privileged information about the challenges, any node with 
access to the distributed storage can also be used for verifying submissions. 
The command-line interface is a Python script used for automating modifications on 
the distributed storage and uses libsodium for all implementations of cryptography. 
Currently, the following operations are supported: 
• Login: Connects to GitHub or GitLab, generates an API token and creates a fork 
of the CTF’s main repository. 
• Register: Registers a new team and creates a pull request. 
• Challenges: Lists available challenges with their title, description, categories and 
rewards. 
• Submit: Checks if the challenge’s private key can be successfully computed from 
the flag provided by the competitor, then generates a submission request of the 
zero-knowledge proof. 
• Score: Reads the accepted submissions file and presents the scoreboard. 
The web interface uses the repository as a GitHub page which exposes files with an 
HTTP server. This allows the challenges and scoreboard to be viewed in a more user-
friendly way. The interface is implemented using only client-side programming 
languages (HTML, CSS and JavaScript). Challenges and scoreboard files are loaded 
using Ajax to give a dynamic feel. 
It is worth noting that the distributed storage could also be implemented using a 
blockchain. This would allow a fully distributed implementation of NIZKCTF in which 
submission proofs are appended to the blockchain and validated by contest participants. 
We do not choose such an implementation because it would require a small transaction 
fee for each submitted proof and extra complexity. 
Validation 
To validate our proposal, we first conducted two small CTFs as pilot tests. The first one 
was Pwn2Win Platform Test Edition – PTE (github.com/pwn2winctf/PTE), a 
competition for 10 international invited teams. The objective of PTE was to assess the 
usefulness and security of NIZKCTF. In order to achieve that, we used the Goal, 
Question, Metric (GQM) paradigm,15 a mechanism for defining and evaluating goals 
using measurement. 
GQM defines a measurement model on three levels: conceptual level (Goal), 
operational level (Question) and quantitative level (Metric). GQM templates are a 
structured way of specifying goals and contains the following fields: purpose, object of 
study, focus, stakeholder and context. Here is a GQM template to express the goal of our 
study: The purpose of this study was to evaluate the usefulness of NIZKCTF when being 
used by the participants in a CTF competition. 
To characterize the measurement object, we defined the research question RQ1: Is our 
implementation of NIZKCTF able to provide the features (e.g., challenges, submissions 
and scoreboard) of a common CTF? 
Pwn2Win PTE had 7 challenges and duration of 12 hours. There were one challenge 
for exploitation, cryptography, web, networking and miscellaneous, and two about 
reverse engineering. Teams were able to solve the challenges and there was a scoreboard, 
just like a common CTF. Players also gave good feedback and no one had objections in 
using NIZKCTF in future CTFs. Therefore, we support a positive answer for RQ1. 
From the 10 invited teams, 5 of them scored (solved at least one challenge). Since the 
CTF had many low-complexity challenges and the invited teams were very experienced 
(for example, one of the teams was the 2016 second place at CTFtime), we assume that 
teams that did not score were focused on trying to exploit the platform, as we present 
next. 
Here is another GQM template to express another goal of our study: The purpose of 
this study was to evaluate the security of NIZKCTF against attacks to the platform from 
the participants in a CTF competition. 
To characterize the measurement object, we defined the research question RQ2: Is any 
participant able to attack the platform and compromise the CTF result? 
To answer this question, we made a bug bounty program, with 450 BRL in cash prizes 
for teams who found vulnerabilities to compromise the result. During and after (we kept 
the platform online for 20 days) the CTF, teams were not able to do that. Therefore, we 
support a negative answer for RQ2. 
After that, we conducted the second pilot test: SCMPv8 CTF (github.com/scmp-
ctf/SCMPv8), during the 8th Computer Science and Engineering Week (SeComp) at the 
Federal University of São Carlos (UFSCar). The purpose of this study was to evaluate the 
ease of use of NIZKCTF when being used by Brazilian undergraduate students in a CTF 
competition. 
To characterize the measurement object, we defined the research question RQ3: Would 
students take their time to learn how to use NIZKCTF when presented with an incentive? 
We conducted SCMPv8 in two different tracks: one of them using a traditional web-
browser based CTF platform, and the other one using NIZKCTF. Challenges available in 
the traditional platform were a subset of the ones in NIZKCTF, and players were allowed 
to participate in both tracks. Winners of the NIZKCTF track received 4 tickets to attend 
Hackers 2 Hackers Conference (worth a total of 1200 BRL). 
Students from other universities were invited to participate remotely. The traditional 
track received 27 team subscriptions, from which 14 teams solved at least one challenge, 
and 3 teams eventually solved every challenge available. The NIZKCTF track received 5 
team subscriptions, from which 4 teams solved at least one challenge, and 2 teams 
eventually solved every challenge available. From this data, we infer a mixed answer for 
RQ3, since only the most skilled teams took their time to use NIZKCTF. 
Deployment 
Pwn2Win 2017 was the first large-scale CTF on which NIZKCTF was deployed in 
production. During the 48 hours of the competition, 283 teams registered, with 207 
scoring at least one point. From those teams, 30 were from Brazil and 21 scored points. 
The best placed Brazilian teams finished at the 11th, 27th and 30th ranking positions. The 
main repository used to keep track of the submissions had 1372 clones and more than 
3800 commits submitted by more than 320 players (repository contributors). The full 
record of submissions can be found in the submissions repository 
(github.com/pwn2winctf/2017submissions). 
During the contest, the scalability of this model was tested and validated. The page 
containing the challenge listing and scoreboard had 2.7 million HTTP requests. The flag 
submission process also worked as expected during different loads. The mean time 
between submissions was 3 minutes, reaching one submission every 2 seconds during 
peak hours. Figure 4 presents the number of flag submissions by hour. 
Figure 4. The Pwn2Win CTF 2017 platform processed at least 5 correct flag submissions 
per hour, except for a brief hiatus in October 22 at 6:00 UTC-2. 
In moments of many concurrent submissions, we started observing failures in GitHub's 
merge API. This was an undocumented behavior that was not triggered in small-scale 
tests. To mitigate this problem, we patched the application with a hotfix to retry the API 
request in case of errors. This solution was enough to ensure the correct behavior of the 
system. 
With the growing interest in CTFs, there is a need for a secure and auditable platform. 
We presented a novel platform called NIZKCTF: Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge 
Capture the Flag. Through the security properties assured by the cryptographic 
mechanisms, we claim that a CTF running on NIZKCTF is more secure than when 
running a traditional platform. 
The implementation of NIZKCTF was tested in three different jeopardy-style CTFs 
with different characteristics and sizes. In these events, the proposed system was shown 
to be a safe, scalable and openly auditable alternative to current CTF platforms. During 
this period no team was able to take advantage of the platform, no tampering happened, 
and the full history was available to every team. 
As future work, we intend to continue using our proposed platform in upcoming 
competitions. We also intend to develop a fully web-based client using Ajax to commit 
directly through GitHub/GitLab API endpoints. This will reduce the barriers for team 
registration and participation without compromising the benefits of the platform. 
Extending the ideas presented here to attack/defense CTFs would also be an interesting 
exercise. We hope that NIZKCTF will further engage the Brazilian community in CTF 
competitions and cybersecurity training. 
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